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Abstract:
In this paper, we present a detailed and comprehensive complementarity model for
computing market equilibrium values in the European natural gas system. Market play-
ers include producers and their marketing arms which we call "transmitters", pipeline
and storage operators, marketers, LNG lique￿ers, regasi￿ers, tankers, and three end-use
consumption sectors. The economic behavior of producers, transmitters, pipeline and
storage operators, lique￿ers and regasi￿ers is modeled via optimization problems whose
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions in combination with market-clearing
conditions form the complementarity system. The LNG tankers, marketers and con-
sumption sectors are modeled implicitly via appropriate cost functions, aggregate demand
curves, and ex-post calculations, respectively. The model is run on several case studies
that highlight its capabilities, including a simulation of a disruption of Russian supplies
via Ukraine.
Keywords: European Natural Gas Market, Global LNG market, Mixed Complemen-
tarity Problem
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1. Introduction
Many European countries have only limited domestic reserves of natural gas, and are
therefore dependent on a small number of pipeline exporters to secure their supplies via
pipeline. This situation enables strategic producers to exert market power resulting in
higher prices for a variety of consumers downstream, as was already analyzed in [51]. The
dependence of importing countries on one or a few suppliers was in evidence in January
of 2006 when Gazprom, the large Russian gas and oil company shut down gas ￿ owing to
Ukraine due to contractual disputes ([52]-[62]; [68] provide an in-depth analysis).
By no means is strategic power of the producers limited to Gazprom. Other examples
include the Algerian Sonatrach that supplies a large share of natural gas to Southern
Europe (Italy, Spain), and the Norwegian gas export consortium Petoro (selling the gas
produced by Statoil and Hydro) that supplies large parts of Northern Europe including
Germany, France, Belgium and the UK. In addition to issues of supply security for the
EU there are questions of power sector environmental constraints which generally favor
natural gas over other fossil fuels, such as coal or oil.
The situation in the European natural gas market has changed considerably over the
last few years with the advent of the technology of liquefaction of natural gas and the
possibility to import large amounts of Lique￿ed Natural Gas (LNG) by tanker to Europe.
Although LNG has been used since the 1960s as a way to transport natural gas over long
distances to isolated marketplaces, its utilization until the end of the 1990s was mainly
limited to supply Japan and South Korea. Several reasons explain the recent strong de-
velopment of LNG in the Atlantic basin. Political and economic considerations of supply
security favor diversi￿cation to decrease dependency on single (or few) external suppli-
ers. Importing LNG is a way to diversify gas supplies away from pipelines and create
more supply options. Another reason for the attractiveness of LNG are the still increas-
ing economies of scale for LNG equipment ([8], [18]) that allow for increasingly cheaper
long-distance transports. LNG also is an alternative to domestic production and pipeline
imports in times of growing demand for natural gas and anticipated depletion of domestic
resources either voluntarily (e.g., the Netherlands) or involuntarily (e.g., Canada). In
the former case, the Netherlands has voluntarily chosen a production cap that sustains
domestic independence for a longer period but limits the possibility for neighboring coun-
tries to import. Thus, while natural gas markets previously were continental (Europe,
North America) due to accessibility of pipelines, the rise of LNG is creating one global
market with, for example, the East Coast of the United States and Europe competing for
LNG in the Atlantic Basin.
Consistent with the trend towards increasing reliance on LNG, many countries have
policies in place which should stimulate the development of LNG infrastructure. Several
of the European Commission￿ s (EC) priority projects in the Trans-European Energy Net-
works are LNG-related [14], [16], [17]. Figure 1 shows the anticipated increase in LNG
import capacity by country expressed in billions of cubic meters (bcm) per year.1 Major
1The current ￿ve year horizon is 2006-2011. Aggregate capacity is shown for terminals for which con-























Figure 1. Existing and anticipated LNG import capacities in Europe [bcm/year]
increases will be seen in the United Kingdom (+39 bcm), Italy (+20 bcm), Spain (+17.5
bcm) and France (+16.5 bcm).
The United States has traditionally relied on natural gas imports by pipeline from
Canada, in addition to its domestic production. But LNG constitutes an increasing
share. The U.S. imported 17.87 bcm of LNG in 2005, almost three times as much as
the LNG imports in 2000 ([5], [7]). Declining domestic production in the United States
and Canada will need to be replaced, and the U.S. will increasingly rely on LNG to ￿ll
the gap [19]. With several provisions in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 [21] the United
States aims to encourage the development of the domestic infrastructure for importing
LNG. Currently, the U.S. has ￿ve regasi￿cation terminals in place with total regasi￿cation
capacity of 52 bcm/year; soon there will be eight. According to the U.S. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) [24], there are plans for 31 more, not all of which may
be built though due to strong societal opposition.
Besides natural gas importing countries, exporting countries also have clear incentives
to increase the share of LNG in their natural gas portfolio, seeking demand security and
bene￿ting from the potential high pro￿ts in the LNG supply chains [18]. Between 1997
and 2002 the number of LNG exporting countries rose from nine to 12, and total shipped
volumes increased by more than 40% in that period. Egypt started LNG exports in 2002,
Norway and Russia are expected to start exporting LNG exports in short term, possibly
soon making a total of 15 LNG exporting countries.
struction has started, or is expected to begin by 2008. Data are from several sources, including [47],
[65].
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Figure 2. Global natural gas consumption and trade in 2000 and 2005 [bcm/year]
Figure 2 shows that between 2000 and 2005 world wide natural gas consumption in-
creased by 13% ([5], [7]). In the same period, the share of internationally traded gas in
total consumption rose from 21.6% to 26.2%. Natural gas trade by pipeline increased by
37%, LNG trade by 38%. In the years to come, LNG is expected to outpace the growth
in pipeline trade by far, accounting for possibly more than half of interregional gas trade
by 2030 [46].
In this paper, we present a new, detailed model of the European natural gas market
which accounts for the issues of market power of exporters and of globalizing natural gas
markets with LNG trade. Besides a disaggregated representation of the European market,
we cover all relevant pipeline exporters to Europe (Russia, Caspian Region, North Africa,
Middle East) and all LNG exporters globally (North and Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East,
South-East Asia, Australia and Latin America) as well as all other LNG importing regions
in the world. This allows us to analyze possible substitution e⁄ects between pipeline and
LNG exporters on the one hand, and competition of demand between di⁄erent LNG
importing countries on the other hand.
The market participants being modeled include: producers and their marketing and
trading arms which we call "transmitters", 2 pipeline and storage operators, LNG liq-
ue￿ers, regasi￿ers, tankers, marketers (implicitly), and consumers in three sectors (resi-
dential/commercial, industrial, and power generation) via their aggregate inverse demand
functions. These players, except for LNG tankers, marketers and consumers, are mod-
eled via convex optimization problems, whose Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality
conditions [2] are both necessary and su¢ cient for global optimality. Necessity follows
2Transmitters do not take care of pipeline or other gas transportation issues. Their function is to market
the gas produced by their production company counterparts.
3DIW-Discussion Paper 732 Egging, Gabriel, Holz, Zhuang
due to the polyhedrality of the feasible regions and su¢ ciency due to the convexity of the
objective functions and the polyhedral feasible regions. Collecting these KKT conditions
for all the players and combining them with market-clearing conditions constitutes an
instance of a nonlinear complementarity problem (NCP) or variational inequality prob-
lem (VI) referred to as complementarity problem [23]. The optimization problems of the
players are typically pro￿t maximization objectives subject to operational constraints,
e.g., production rates. In all cases, except for the transmitters, players are price-takers in
the production, transportation, LNG, and storage markets.
Only the transmitters, being the pipeline sales end of the production companies that
interface with downstream markets, can exert market power. They are modeled as being
able to behave strategically in multiple countries accessible by pipeline from the producing
country (possibly via transit countries). Modeling the transmitters as separate entities
can be seen as anticipating European Commission decisions striving for legal unbundling
of the various parts in the natural gas supply chain. This is a change compared to [13]
where the production companies were modeled as vertically integrated comprising both
production and sales functions.3 However, it is important to note that the model set-up
presented allows for representing vertically integrated production and trading companies
where the latter are (legally) unbundled from the former. Lastly, the transmitters are a
convenient mechanism that allows for proper accounting of transportation charges instead
of using aggregate pipelines between production and consumption markets with no transit
nodes as was the case in [29]. LNG tankers and consumers are modeled implicitly by
cost and aggregate inverse demand functions, respectively.
To our knowledge, the concept of international traders (the transmitters) operating
separately from producers has not been used in other natural gas market models. Mod-
eling transmitters as separate players increases model transparency by clearly separating
the production and the sales/export operations via pipeline of the production companies
which are characterized by di⁄erent operational costs and constraints. These players can
be seen in the actual market: for example, the trading business of gas companies like
Gazprom or GasTerra (Netherlands) is done by separate a¢ liates from the production
companies; by Gazexport in the Russian case, by GasTerra in the Dutch case. Especially
in the European Union, legal requirements have led to the separation (unbundling) of
production and trade operations of companies. Although these separate units may still
belong to the same holding company, each a¢ liate has its own operations and optimiza-
tion problem under di⁄erent constraints. We take account of the fact that the production
and the trade operations could be part of the same company by not modeling any strategic
behavior or bargaining between these two operations. The producer sells natural gas to
the transmitter at a competitive (marginal cost) price. On the other hand the transmit-
ter, the player operating in international natural gas markets, may behave strategically
vis-￿-vis its competitors, the other transmitters.
A similar rationale of modeling an activity separately that may be executed within the
same company is generally applied to the pipeline operation that is done by an indepen-
3Other major changes are the detailed representation of all agents in the LNG supply chain, the incorpo-
ration of all countries in the world involved in LNG imports and exports and a thorough update of the
input database.
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dent but perfectly competitive pipeline operator. Traditionally, in Europe the pipeline
grid belonged to integrated production or wholesale trade companies. But the recent
liberalization e⁄orts of the European Commission have led to separation (unbundling) of
the pipeline operation from production and/or trade. The interaction between the trans-
mitters and the pipeline operators is such that the pipeline operators allocate transport
capacity to transmitters that need to transport gas to their consumer markets.
While complementarity models of natural gas markets have been formulated and devel-
oped with real or realistic data before, e.g.,[13], [37], [34], [1], [26], [29], [4], [50], [38], the
one presented in this paper distinguishes itself by its level of detail relative to the number
and variety of players, the number of seasons (three seasons: low demand, high demand,
and peak), as well as the number of countries modeled (52). In this respect, the model we
present is approaching the level of detail of the Rice University World Gas Trade model
[36], or the Gas Systems Analysis Model (GSAM) for North America ([28], [27]). This
level of detail with a representation of the global LNG market and combined with the
strategic behavior of the producers (via their transmitters) is unique and represents the
main contribution of this work. The second contribution is the use of this model to ana-
lyze a series of geopolitical and market-based cases. One scenario involves the curtailment
of gas supplies to Ukraine by Gazprom motivated by actual events in January, 2006. The
other cases include: a perfect competition relaxation for the producers (transmitters), a
shut-o⁄ of the relatively inexpensive gas that comes from Algeria, and a case relating to
capacity expansions in LNG and pipeline capacity corresponding approximately to the
year 2011. 4 Lastly, the base year of the simulations was taken as 2004.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we describe the complemen-
tarity model derived from the optimization problems and market-clearing conditions; in
Section 3 we discuss the numerical results of the case studies, Section 4 provides conclu-
sions, and lastly, an Appendix provides key data and modeling details.
2. Model Formulation
The economic behavior of the market participants in the natural gas sector is modeled
by optimization problems for each of the players and market-clearing conditions linking
them. The players are: producers, transmitters, lique￿ers, regasi￿ers, storage operators,
marketer/shippers (hereafter referred to as marketers and implicitly modeled), and con-
sumers in three sectors (residential/commercial, industrial, and electric power generation).
A schematic overview of the gas network and market participants is depicted in Figure 3.
The countries (or nodes) are the ovals surrounding the players for that node. Also, the
consumption sectors are shown as a triangle. In this ￿gure, the following players can be
distinguished:
￿ Producers (C1;C3) located at a production node (could be more than one per coun-
try)
4The scenarios involving disruptions for Ukraine or Algeria have also been analyzed in [70], for the
year 2030. However, the current model has a greater level of detail and includes seasonality aspects, in
comparison with [70].
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Figure 3. Overview Natural Gas Market Players
￿ Transmitters (T1;T3) operating at production, transit and consumption nodes (one
per producer)
￿ LNG Lique￿ers (L1) (could be more than one per country )
The following players are active at the consumption nodes only:
￿ LNG Regasi￿ers (R3) (could be more than one per country)
￿ Storage operators (S1;S3) (could be more than one per country)
￿ Marketers (M1;M3)(one per country)
￿ Consumers (K1;K2;K3;) respectively, for the residential/commercial, industrial,
and electric power sectors .
International pipeline ￿ ows are depicted via inter-country arcs whereas LNG tankers
routes are described by arcs between lique￿ers and regasi￿ers. At the production nodes,
there is local gas transport from the producers to their transmitter and, possibly, to
any lique￿er. For example, in Figure 3, all ￿ ows originating from C1 are depicted as
solid lines, ￿ ows from C3 as dashed lines. At the consumption nodes, gas ￿ ows from
the transmitters to the storage operators and marketers, where transportation is de￿ned
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to be on the local (i.e., national grid). Flows into and from storage are indicated with
a diamond shape at the start of the arrow. The marketers are the only interface with
the three consumption sectors and receive gas from producers via the transmitters (using
pipelines) or via the regasi￿ers in each of the three seasons, and from the storage operators
in the withdrawal seasons (2 and 3, for high and peak demand, respectively). Flows to
￿nal consumption sectors are indicated with an oval shape at the start of the arrow.
Transmitters or regasi￿ers supply storage operators in the low demand season (1) when
there is injection into storage. In what follows, volumes are generally denoted in kcm, or
1000 m3, and prices are in e/kcm. The general notation with respect to nodes and time
periods is:
￿ Y is the set of years, y 2 Y
￿ D is the set of seasons, d 2 D
￿ daysd is the number of days in season d
￿ N is the set of nodes, n 2 N
where jY j = 1 for this paper unless otherwise stated. The number of days per season
and set of seasons are user-de￿ned (see Appendix C), and the set of nodes includes all
countries of the European pipeline and the global LNG market (see Appendix A). We
next describe the speci￿c optimization problems faced by the market participants and the
complementarity problem that results.
2.1. Producers
Each production company located at a node is modeled as choosing gas production rates
so as to maximize its net pro￿t over the time horizon. The net pro￿t is the di⁄erence
between seasonal revenue and seasonal costs, summed over all seasons and years. This
objective is subject to constraints on production rates, total production volume, and
nonnegativity of the quantity produced. This is an approximation to the very complicated
spatial and temporal dependencies that can exist. In particular, as described in [27] and
[28], one would need to take into account reservoir variables such as porosity, permeability,
thickness, production in previous time periods, rig movements between regions, etc.; see [9]
for a discussion of relevant petroleum engineering principles. The total cost function takes
into account all the expenses associated with producing at a given rate. As producing at
a higher rate should require more resources (machines, personnel, etc.) it is reasonable
to assume this function to be non-decreasing and convex. The producers are modeled as
price-takers in a perfectly competitive environment. The complete optimization problem
for producer p is thus:



















































pdy ￿ 0 8d;y (4)
where
￿ the ￿P￿superscript means for all producers, not for a speci￿c one (similar notational
concepts for other players)
￿ P is the set of all producers in the network, p 2 P
￿ P(n) is the set of producers located at node n
￿ n(p) is the node where producer p is located
￿ cP
p (SALESP




p is the upper bound on the production rate for producer p (volume/day)
￿ PRODp is the total production forecast for the time horizon (volume)
￿ ￿P
n(p)dy is the selling price of gas for producer p in season d and year y (e/volume)
(exogenous to producers but a variable in the overall complementarity system)
￿ SALESP
pdy is the decision variable for the rate of gas sold by producer p to the
transmitter at the same node in season d and year y (volume/day)5
Note that the Greek letters shown in parentheses besides the constraints are the associ-
ated dual variables (Lagrange multipliers). The dual variables associated with inequalities
(hence nonnegative in sign) will be ￿;￿; or ￿ with appropriate super- and subscripts. By
contrast, free variables associated with equality constraints to an objective function (see
for example in the transmitters problem in (10)) will be denoted as ￿ with appropriate
super- and subscripts. Lastly, all prices that are determined by market-clearing conditions
outside of the individual optimization problems (hence, exogenous to these problems) will
be denoted as ￿ with appropriate super- and subscripts except for the inverse demand
function ￿W
ndy; which is under the strategic in￿ uence of the transmitters. Since the well-
head prices are exogenous to the producers, the producer problem (1)-(4) is a convex
program as long as the cost function is convex, which, as stated above is a reasonable
5Note that LNG lique￿ers buy directly from the producers and that the market-clearing
condition for production includes a term denoting the purchases by the lique￿er from the
producer at the same node.
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approximation to reality. As such, the KKT conditions are both necessary and su¢ cient
for optimality.
These conditions are shown below but for ease of presentation have been divided by
period lengths (daysd), resulting in a more compact formulation but not a⁄ecting the
numerical results, except for a scaling factor for the duals in question. For example,
consider the following two inequalities providing the same restriction on the daily sales
















:The dual variable ￿pdy for this latter equation
expresses the marginal value of an extra unit in production rate for the whole period,
whereas the dual variable ￿pdy of the previous expression gives the marginal value of an
extra unit in production rate for every day in the period. A similar reasoning applies to
the KKT conditions for the other parts of the overall complementarity system. Thus, the

































pdy ￿ 0 8d;y (6)









p ￿ 0 (7)
In addition, one must consider market-clearing conditions that state that the supply
of gas for a production region equals the demand for gas being sent to the transmitter















t(p)n(p)dy is the is the decision variable for purchases by the transmitter from
the producer (volume/day)
￿ PURCHL P
ldy is the is the decision variable for purchases by the lique￿ers from their
producer (volume/day)
2.2. Transmitters
A transmitter operates for one producer and represents the gas trading arm of the
production company. This approach is consistent with having production and trading
carried out by separate parts of the same overall organization or by legally separate
entities. In any event, each transmitter is dedicated to a producer and a transmitter
purchases gas only from its own producer and then sells the gas, possibly by exporting
the gas to other countries. We distinguish two types of transmitters:
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1. Transmitters operating only at the domestic node of the producer, in case it is a
small producer and doesn￿ t export any gas. Previous papers usually refer to this
production as exogenous production, e.g., [4].
2. Transmitters that can operate at any consumption node that can be reached via
pipelines through transit nodes from their own producer￿ s node. An example is
Norway, both a gas producing and exporting country. The transmitter associated
with the Norwegian producer will be present in European consuming countries such
as the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Germany, Poland, Aus-
tria, Italy, etc., but will not be present in:
a. Algeria, because Algeria is not a consumption node in the model
b. Japan, because Japan can￿ t be reached by pipeline from Norway
c. Tunisia, because Tunisia is only a relevant transit country from Algeria into
Europe.
The transmitter is modeled as maximizing its net pro￿t subject to balance equations
(￿ ow conservation constraints in each node) as well as nonnegativity constraints on its
variables. The revenues are derived from the sales to marketers (SALEST!M
tndy ) and to
storage operators (SALEST!S
tny ). To determine the revenues, the sales to the storage
operators are multiplied by the market-clearing price ￿T
ndy. The sales to the marketers
are multiplied by a convex combination of the price determined by the inverse demand
function ￿
W(T)
ndy (￿) or by the market-clearing wholesale price ￿W
ndy if no market power is
exerted.
This convex combination of the price is determined by the market power constant for
the transmitter t, ￿
C
t 2 [0;1] where ￿
C
t = 0 means no market power and ￿
C
t = 1 means
that the transmitter is a full Cournot player. Since traders in the natural gas market can
and may exert di⁄erent levels of market power, not captured by the theoretical concepts
of perfect competition or Cournot behavior, other values for ￿
C
t are allowed. Although
market power values between 0 and 1 have been used before (in [71] it is called degree of
competition) there is no literature describing the precise meaning of other values than 0 or
1 for the market power constant. To prevent discussion about arbitrary values with several
digits, we limited ourselves to a small yet representative set of values: f0;0:25;0:5;0:75;1g
and determined the actual values during the model calibration:
The costs to the transmitter include purchasing the gas from the producer
(￿P
n(p(t))dyPURCHT P









tnmdy is the decision variable for the rate of gas transported by transmitter t
from node n to neighboring node m in season d and year y (volume/day)
￿ ￿A
nmdy is the congestion fee of the arc (n;m) in season d and year y (e/volume),
determined by the pipeline operator￿ s problem
￿ ￿
Reg
nmdy is the regulated pipeline transportation costs for the arc a from n to m in
season d and year y (e/volume)
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￿ A(t) is the set of arcs (n;m) that transmitter t could use. A(t) := f(n;m) : t 2
T(n;m)g 6
￿ lossnm is the loss factor for the arc a from n to m
Anticipating EU regulations, we assume complete Third Party Access to the interna-
tional pipeline network. Hence, any transmitter can contract transmission capacity with
any pipeline. To introduce seasonality of storage use, an indicator ￿
low
d is used. ￿
low
d = 1
if d =0 10, the low-demand season (injection into storage), and 0 otherwise.



















































































tndy ￿ 0 8n;d;y (11)
SALES
T!S
tny ￿ 0 8n;y (12)
PURCH
T P
tndy ￿ 0 8n = n(p(t));d;y (13)
FLOW
T
tnmdy ￿ 0 8(n;m) 2 A(t);d;y (14)
with the additional de￿nitions that:
￿ T is the set of transmitters, t 2 T
￿ p(t) is the producer for which transmitter t is the trading agent
￿ N(t) is the set of nodes where transmitter t is present
￿ T(n) is the set of transmitters t present at node n
￿ T(n;m) is the set of transmitters t that can use arc (n;m), T(n;m) := ft 2 (T(n)\
T(m)g
6Here, arc (n;m) is the unique link between one node and another one, for notatinal simplicity, we use a
to denote arcs when interpretation is unambiguous.
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￿ PURCHT P
tndy is the decision variable for the rate of gas bought by transmitter t
from its producer p(t) located at node n 2 (N(t) \ N(p)) in season d and year y
(volume/day)
By in￿ uencing the inverse demand function ￿
W(T)
ndy (￿) the producer via its transmitter,
can exert market power by withholding supplies to downstream customers. In particular,
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represents the total sales
from the transmitter and other transmitters to the marketers as well as sales coming from
the regasi￿ers and storage operators, respectively. Only the sales from the transmitter,
SALEST!M
ndy ; are variables in the transmitter￿ s optimization problem above. The other
variables are treated as exogenous by the transmitter.
The KKT conditions for the transmitter￿ s problem as well as for the other players are
presented in Appendix B. To determine the price ￿T
ndy, market-clearing conditions are also
included. It is only the storage operators in the low demand season that require a market-
clearing condition (with the transmitters having market power over the marketers). For














n1y (free) 8n 2 N(t);y (16)
2.3. LNG Lique￿ers
LNG lique￿ers receive natural gas from the producers, liquefy the gas and then send
it to downstream regasi￿ers by LNG tankers. The lique￿ers maximize their net revenue
by deciding on how much to sell to regasi￿ers (SALESL
ldy) and how much to purchase
from the producers (PURCHL P
ldy ). For a particular season and year, their revenue is






ldy from which is subtracted their purchasing
costs ￿P
n(l)dyPURCHL P
ldy , distribution costs daysduL P
l PURCHL P
ldy from the producer,
as well as transmission costs using the tankers cL
l (SALESL
ldy) where
￿ L is the set of LNG lique￿ers, l 2 L
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￿ L(n) is the set of LNG lique￿ers located at node n
￿ L(p) is the set of LNG lique￿ers buying from producer p
￿ n(l) is the node where LNG lique￿er l is located
￿ p(l) is the producer p from which LNG lique￿er l can buy
￿ cL
l (SALESL
ldy) is the liquefaction cost function of LNG lique￿er l (e/volume/day)
￿ uL P
l are the unit distribution costs for producer p to LNG lique￿er l (e/volume/day)
Note that both the selling price of gas, ￿L
n(l)dy as well as the buying price from the
producer ￿P
n(p(l))dy; are exogenous to the price-taking lique￿er but are variables in the
overall complementarity problem. SALESL
ldy and PURCHL P
ldy are the decision variables
of the LNG lique￿er. The optimization of net revenues is subject to liquefaction capacity
constraints as well as balancing and nonnegativity restrictions. Consequently, the full





























































ldy ￿ 0 8d;y (20)
PURCH
L P




l is the upper bound on the LNG liquefaction rate for LNG lique￿er l (vol-
ume/day)
￿ lossl is the liquefaction loss factor for LNG lique￿er l (%)
In the liquefaction market, the total supply of lique￿ed gas at a node match the total
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2.4. LNG Regasi￿ers
The modeling of the regasi￿ers is similar to the concept of the peak gas operator in
the North American market as presented in [26] and [29]. There, the peak gas operators
are modeled with production bounds and are active only in the peak demand season. We
now take account of the new situation on the global natural gas markets where LNG has
become part of the gas supply mix throughout the year. Hence, we model the regasi￿ers
as being active in every season. They are the downstream interface with the lique￿ers
and are a new player compared to previous models ([26],[29],[4], [13],[38]). Modeling both
types of players allows us to represent the entire LNG value chain, with the LNG tankers
activity represented by the arcs between the lique￿ers and the regasi￿ers.
The regasi￿ers maximize their net revenue by deciding how much re-gasi￿ed natural
gas to sell to the storage operators SALESR!S
rdy (in the low-demand season) and to
the marketers SALESR!M
rdy (in all seasons), and how much to purchase and transport
from the lique￿ers PURCHR L
bdy . The regasi￿ers problem implicitly includes the LNG












. These and the other costs in-











rdy) are subtracted from the regasi￿er￿ s revenue. We assume the regasi￿ca-
tion cost function to be convex, based on a somewhat similar argument made for the
producers. The regasi￿cation operations are constrained by a limited regasi￿cation rate
per day (REG
R
r ), and is subject to losses (lossr). The sets and indices in this optimization
problem are the following:
￿ B the set of boats (arcs), b 2 B [unlimited marine capacity and ￿xed distribution
charges are assumed]
￿ B(n) the set of boats shipping to node n
￿ ne(b) the destination (end) node of boat (arc) b
￿ ns(b) the origin (source) node of boat (arc) b
￿ n(r) the node where LNG regasi￿er r is located;
￿ R the set of LNG regasi￿ers, r 2 R
￿ R(n) the set of LNG regasi￿ers located at node n.
Note that, here again, the selling prices of natural gas (￿W
n(r)dy for the wholesale price
and ￿R
n(r)dy for the price of sales to storage) as well as the buying price from the lique￿ers
(￿L
ns(b)dy) are exogenous to the regasi￿ers optimization problems because they are deter-
mined in the market-clearing conditions with the players from the "adjacent" markets.
The optimization problem for regasi￿er r involves choosing the values for SALESR!M
rdy ,
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SALESR!S
rdy and PURCHR L
bdy to maximize net pro￿ts subject to regasi￿cation rates,






































































rdy ￿ 0 8d;y (25)
SALES
R!S
rdy ￿ 0 8d = 1;y (26)
PURCH
R L
bdy ￿ 0 8b : ne(b) = n(r);d;y (27)
The total supply for regasi￿ed natural gas must match the demand for it at each node.
This equality is enforced by market-clearing conditions. As far as sales to marketers are
concerned, this is taken care of in the inverse demand functions of the marketers. The
market-clearing conditions between the regasi￿er and the storage operator in the low













n1y (free) 8n;y (28)
where PURCHS R
sy is the decision variable for the storage operator￿ s purchases from the
regasi￿er.
2.5. Storage Operators
The storage operators are modeled similarly to the equivalent players in [26] and [29]
with the exception that they are now supplied by regasi￿ers, too. The storage operators
buy gas from the transmitters (PURCHS T
sy ) or regasi￿ers (PURCHS R
sy ) and inject it
into storage in the low demand season. They withdraw gas and sell it to the marketers
(SALESS!M
sdy ) in the two other, high demand seasons. This seasonal pattern of storage
operation is a standard assumption in the modeling literature (e.g., [71]). The modeling
of storage operators as actual natural gas traders, that are not only trading capacities but
the gas itself, corresponds to the business model of many independent storage operators
in Europe and especially in the UK. In our model, storage is used for the inter-seasonal
arbitrage of demand, which implies that all gas that is injected in the low-demand season
is withdrawn in the high-demand seasons.









subtracted from the total costs. Total costs include the
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the costs of operating the storage facility (cS
s(PURCHS T
sy +PURCHS R
sy )), assumed to
be a convex function, and the costs of transporting the gas to the storage from the trans-

















storage operator￿ s optimization problem is then to select values for the decision vari-
ables PURCHS T
sy , PURCHS R
sy and SALESS!M
sdy subject to a number of technical
constraints, such as upper bounds on the daily injection rate (INJ
S
s), on the daily with-
drawal rate (EXT
S
s) and on the working gas volume (WRKG
S
s) which can be considered
as the storage capacity7. The following sets and indices are used in the storage operator￿ s
optimization program:
￿ S the set of storage operators
￿ S(n) the set of storage operators located at node n
￿ n(s) the node where the storage operator s is located
As the storage operators are assumed to behave competitively vis-￿-vis their upstream
and downstream markets, they are price-takers for the purchase prices (￿R
n(s)dyand ￿T
ndy)
and the selling prices to the marketers (￿W
n(s)dy). The interaction with the upstream and
downstream markets is modeled in the market-clearing conditions with the regasi￿er, the
transmitter and the marketers (28), (16), and (41), respectively.
The optimization problem for storage operator s therefore is to maximize its net pro￿t
by adjusting sales and purchases while taking into account injection, extraction, mater-
ial balance, and volume constraints as well as nonnegativity conditions for the decision






































7Working gas, as opposed to base gas, is the amount of gas that can be injected and withdrawn. A
certain minimum amount of base gas is necessary to maintain a pressure level in the storage for normal
operations. To inject the gas into the reservoir, a certain amount is needed to fuel the compressors
e⁄ectively resulting in a loss (losss) of the original amount.












































sdy ￿ 0 8d = 2;3;y (34)
PURCH
S T
sy ￿ 0 8y;t 2 T(s(n)) (35)
PURCH
S R
sy ￿ 0 8y (36)
2.6. Pipeline Operator
The pipeline operator￿ s problem is similar to the one described in [26] and [29]. We
consider a pipeline operator for each pipeline (n;m); (n;m) 2 A (with A the set of pipeline
arcs). The pipeline operator is modeled as a regulated player in the natural gas market
that, based on complete Third Party Access, allocates pipeline capacity to market players
demanding transport capacity. This corresponds to the political willingness in Europe to
restrict the, a priori, high monopolistic revenues of pipeline owners by regulating their
prices or revenues. We assume the ￿rst case of price regulation, where the price paid
for pipeline use (￿
Areg
nmdy) is regulated and ￿xed. The total revenue of a pipeline operator










We concentrate on the variable part of the revenue that the pipeline operator can
in￿ uence in its optimization problem: the congestion revenue. This revenue, for each
season, is based on multiplying the congestion rate ￿A
nmdy by the number of days in that
season and then by the rate of gas sold (the pipeline operator￿ s decision variable) for each
arc (n;m) (SALESA
nmdy).
The pipeline capacity of each pipeline arc (n;m) has a limit on its daily ￿ ows (PL
A
nm).
Capacity constraints of pipelines are an important characteristic of the natural gas market.
A limited import capacity to a country can considerably in￿ uence the market situation in
this country, as a possible oligopolistic player (transmitter) can exert more or less market
power depending on the number of competitors that can enter this market. The pipeline
























nmdy ￿ 0 8d;y (39)
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Note that the congestion fee, ￿A
nmdy, is exogenous to the pipeline operator￿ s optimization
problem. His decision variables are the daily pipeline ￿ ows, SALESA
nmdy. The market-
clearing conditions for pipeline capacity ensures for each pipeline a the equality of ￿ ows
operated by the pipeline operator (SALESA




tnmdy), with T(n;m) the set of transmitters present in both the










nmdy (free) 8(n;m);d;y (40)
2.7. Marketers
Marketers are the interface with the ￿nal demand for natural gas. As such, and as per-
fectly competitive players the marketers simply pass on the ￿nal demand to the upstream
sector. Their inverse demand function ￿
W(T)
ndy (￿) is incorporated in the transmitters￿opti-
mization problem (??). The total purchases of the marketer will by de￿nition equal the
total sales of the other players (transmitters, regasi￿ers, and storage operators) to the
marketer. The following conditions enforce the market clearing wholesale price, ￿W
ndy; to


































Collecting the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions of the players￿op-
timization problems presented above and combining them with the mentioned market-
clearing conditions constitutes an instance of a mixed complementarity problem (MCP)
or variational inequality problem (VI) referred to as complementarity problem [23]. We
ensure that the optimization problems are convex and that their Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
optimality conditions are both necessary (due to polyhedrality of the feasible regions)
and su¢ cient (due to the convexity of the objective functions and the polyhedral feasible
regions) for global optimality of the solution [2].
The MCP model is programmed in GAMS using the PATH MCP solver [10]. The
PATH solver iteratively solves a sequence of linear approximations to the model and avoids
convergence to local non-optimal solutions. Model runs were performed on a computer
with 3.2 Ghz clock speed, 2GB RAM and typically took about one minute to solve.
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3. Numerical Results
This section presents results of using the complementarity system described above in
four cases relative to the base case assumption of market power for the producers (trans-
mitters). These other cases are: 1. if the transmitters were taken to be perfectly
competitive; 2. the disruption of Russian exports via Ukraine; 3. a cuto⁄of the relatively
inexpensive Algerian gas; and 4. capacity expansions in LNG and pipeline infrastructure
corresponding to projections for the year 2011. (The ￿rst cases are simulated for the
base year 2004.) The intention of running these scenarios was to show the breadth of the
model capability as well as to indicate potential impacts on the global gas markets. These
cases are abbreviated as follows: SBC (strategic base case), PCM (perfectly competitive
market), UKR (Ukrainian gas curtailment), ALG (Algerian gas production cuto⁄), 2011
(capacity expansions for 2011).
Note that in this section, all volumes and capacities are in billions of cubic meters per
year (bcm/y), costs and prices are in Euros per thousand cubic meters (e/kcm) with alll
market players and the input data assumptions shown in detail in the Appendices. The
model was ￿rst calibrated for the base case by allowing parameters such as production
capacities, demand curve intercepts and slopes, and market power constants to vary so
as to have outputs match historically reported values for the base year 2004. The mar-
ket power constants for Algeria, the Netherlands, Norway and Russia determined to be
￿
C = 0:75 and for the Caspian Sea region, Denmark and the United Kingdom the values
were ￿
C = 0:25. For price elasticities we followed [13]: -0.25 for the residential/commercial
sector, -0.4 for industrial demand and -0.75 for power generation. Based on [45] and [6]
reference demand levels for 2004 were determined and the model was calibrated resulting
in consumption levels within 1% for each country, except Japan at 1.3%. For separate sea-
sons as well as separate sectors the calibrated outcomes were within 2% for each country,
and within 1% for most. The average wholesale price in Europe after calibration was 148
e/kcm, which compares favorably to reported selling prices of circa 127 e/kcm (Statoil,
[69]), 139 e/kcm (GasTerra, [35]), and the USD ￿gure 126 $/kcm [6].
3.1. Strategic Base Case versus Perfect Competitive Market
All players, except the transmitters, are assumed to be price-takers in all cases. To
simulate a perfectly competitive market for the case PCM the market power constants for
all transmitters ￿
C
t are all set equal to 0. In the following paragraphs the results for the
two cases SBC and PCM are compared to analyze how market power a⁄ects the market
participants, consumed volumes, market prices and producer pro￿ts.
As can be expected, production and consumption are lower in the strategic base case as
compared to a market with perfectly competitive producers. In the strategic scenario, the
transmitters increase prices by withholding quantities. In particular, in the strategic base
case, the total consumption of all included countries is 674 bcm (the calibration value
for 2004) as compared to 731 bcm under a perfect competition assumption (see Figure
4). This means that about 8.4% more consumption occurs when the producers (via their
transmitters) are perfectly competitive; a similar result for production occurs (779 bcm
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for PCM and 721 bcm for SBC, see Figure 5). Additionally, in perfect competition, most
production and export capacities are binding.
Consistent with economic theory, higher prices ensue when the producers are allowed to
exert market power via their transmitters. In particular, Europe sees 27% higher volume-
weighted wholesale prices8 (148 e/kcm vs. 116 e/kcm) as a result of market power;
average worldwide prices are 21% higher. The higher price increase in Europe is due to
the limitation of market power to the transmitters of gas via pipelines in Europe. However,
the global LNG market spreads the higher price level to other markets as well. As Figure
6 shows, the countries with relative price di⁄erences under SBC higher than the European
average are the Netherlands, Hungary, Poland, Turkey, Romania and the United Kingdom
with di⁄erences of 62%, 52%, 38%, 38%, 29%, and 28%, respectively. Countries with low
import capacities (Netherlands, UK) or little diversi￿cation possibilities of pipeline or
LNG imports (Eastern Europe) are impacted most.
Countries with relatively small price di⁄erences between SBC and PCM are Germany
(13%), Spain (10%), France (7%), and Italy (9%). These countries largely depend on
imports. They have access to LNG or have good access to many pipeline suppliers and
thus have a diversi￿ed supply portfolio. They face higher than average prices in PCM,
but su⁄er less from exertion of market power. Especially Spain, France and Italy bene￿t
from their relatively large share of LNG imports and LNG import capacities, since we
assume the LNG players to behave competitively in all cases.
Besides lower consumption and production levels in the strategic base case, the mix
between LNG and pipeline gas is also di⁄erent. In particular, under market power
assumptions, Europe consumes overall less gas (521 vs. 575 bcm) but counts on a larger
share of it being supplied by LNG (7.2% vs. 4.4%). Additionally, in the SBC, Europe
counts on storage for 14.2% of total consumption but only 7.6% under perfect competition.
This is a direct e⁄ect of the higher prices in a Cournot model which provide an incentive
for higher cost suppliers (LNG, storage) to enter the market.
3.2. Disruption Ukrainian Pipelines versus Strategic Base Case
In the winter of 2005-2006, Gazprom decided to cut o⁄its pipeline gas to Ukraine based
on contractual disputes. According to the New York Times, a case was made as to the
political nature of this curtailment [54]. Later in 2006, supply shortages of Russian gas
a⁄ected Georgia ([63], [62], [64]). Gazprom in particular, and Russia in general holds a
strategic advantage given its huge supply of natural gas. According to Stern [67], the
proved gas reserves for Gazprom as of the end of 2004 were 16,357 bcm. The Russian
reserves account for roughly one third of the global natural gas reserves, and its supply
share in European gas consumption is about 30%. Moreover, in the next ten to ￿fteen
years, the global in￿ uence of Russian gas may be even more felt via LNG to Asia and
North America and pipeline gas to Asia [67]. Thus, to represent the case of Russia
exerting market power in the production market, we have designed a case corresponding
to a disruption of pipeline gas to Europe via Ukraine.
8All price and cost comparisons are volume-weighted averages over seasons and countries, unless stated
otherwise.






















Figure 4. Consumption (bcm) in European countries in all ￿ve cases






















Figure 5. Natural Gas Supply by Geographic Area (bcm)






































































% Diff SBC vs PCM
Prices in SBC and % difference with PCM
Figure 6. Prices in SBC and PCM
To simulate the impact on the European gas market of disrupted Ukrainian pipeline
transit the capacities of all Ukrainian outgoing pipelines (a total capacity of 171 bcm per
year) are set to zero.9 The following paragraphs compare the results for the cases UKR
(Ukrainian gas curtailment) and SBC (strategic base case).10
Disruption of Ukrainian supplies leads to a model-wide gas consumption of 604 bcm,
11% lower than the SBC consumption level. European consumption decreases by over 12%
to 456 bcm, the LNG supply increases to 42 bcm. The average worldwide wholesale price
level increases by 16% to 178 e/kcm, and the European price level by 19% to 177 e/kcm.
Storage supplies 59 bcm, 13% of total European consumption, however 15 bcm lower
than in the SBC. Storage cannot play a bigger role mainly due to lack of supply in the
low demand period and resulting higher price levels, especially in Eastern and Central
European countries. Figure 7 shows that Hungary su⁄ers from the largest increase in
wholesale prices, from 157 to 375 e/kcm, due to 80% of its total import capacity being
shut o⁄ with the Ukrainian curtailment.
Tables 1 and 2 show the worldwide LNG shipments respectively for the SBC and UKR
9Setting the transit capacity for the whole year equal to zero is an approximation of the January 2006
events, since the actual disruption lasted for a few days only. One must also keep in mind that the results
of the complementarity model are long-term equilibrium values and do not take into account short term
adjustments.
10The model was run with aggregate demand curves per country and the sector demands were calculated
ex-post based on their actual demand curves. In some countries with low consumption the equilibrium
prices in the UKR case are higher than the demand intercepts of the power generation sector, leading
to some negative values (ex post). As aggregate country demand cannot be negative, and the negative
volumes are small in magnitude (<0.5 bcm per case and 2.1 bcm aggregate) these outcomes were ignored.


































































Wholesale Prices in UKR and SBC
Figure 7. Prices disrupted Ukraine versus SBC
cases. In both cases most LNG lique￿ers are producing at full capacity, except for Norway
which is the most expensive hence the marginal LNG supply option. Algerian supplies
decrease by 1.1 bcm (30.8 to 29.7) and Norwegian LNG supplies decrease by 0.5 bcm (1.0
to 0.5) in the UKR case, presumably because there is less competition for Russian gas in
the European market for their pipeline exports.
On the demand side, two countries import signi￿cantly more, and three countries import
signi￿cantly less LNG. Italy and France have to replace the lost pipeline in￿ ows of Russian
gas and increase LNG imports by 4.5 bcm and 1.9 bcm. Japan, Turkey and South Korea
import 3.8, 2.2 and 1.3 bcm less. Spain, which is a major LNG importer, sees LNG
imports decrease only moderately.
The in￿ uence on international natural gas trade can be described as a "ripple-e⁄ect". In
the SBC, European countries are only supplied by nearby regions: Norway and Mediter-
ranean countries, especially Algeria and Egypt. But when Russian pipeline supplies are
disrupted, the European demand for LNG rises and the Arabian LNG exporting countries
shift some of their shipments to Europe, away from Asia. The U.S. receives less gas from
Algeria and demands more from Trinidad & Tobago, which stops supplying to South Ko-
rea. South Korea and Japan compete for the South East Asian LNG supplies, and as a
result both see prices increase by 13 e/kcm with lower supplies. The global LNG market
provides an alternative gas source for a⁄ected European countries, and as a results global
LNG prices rise. The average LNG selling price excluding transport increases by more
than 13%, from 131 to 148 EUR/kcm.
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Table 1
Wordwide LNG Shipments- Strategic Base Case
NO ALG EGP ARB AUS RUS SEA TRI NIG Total In
BE 0.6 0.2 0.8
UK 0.4 0.1 0.5
POR 2.5 2.5
SPA 17.4 17.4







KOR 21.6 10.6 0.9 33.0
JP 13.1 6.5 55.5 75.1
USA 7.3 12.3 0.9 20.5
CAN 10.6 10.6
Total Out 1.0 30.8 13.2 39.6 13.1 6.5 66.0 13.2 11.4 194.8
Table 2
Wordwide LNG Shipments- Ukrainian Gas Interruption Case
NO ALG EGP ARB AUS RUS SEA TRI NIG Total In
BE 0.5 0.8 1.3
POR 2.3 2.3
SPA 16.7 16.7
FRA 4.0 6.8 3.0 13.8
IT 6.1 6.1
GR 0.2 1.2 1.4




KOR 17.3 14.4 31.7
JP 13.2 6.5 51.6 71.3
USA 5.8 13.2 1.1 20.1
CAN 10.3 10.3
Total Out 0.5 29.7 13.2 39.6 13.2 6.5 66.0 13.2 11.4 193.3
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Figure 8. Decomposition of Turkish supplies in cases SBC and UKR
Under this scenario, while most countries face severe negative rami￿cations of the shut-
o⁄of gas through Ukraine, Turkey￿ s total imports are hardly a⁄ected. Turkey faces a large
decrease in LNG supplies because there is a strong demand for LNG in the rest of Europe
(Figure 8). But it bene￿ts from the availability of more pipeline gas from Russia through
the "Blue Stream" pipeline in the Black Sea which compensates the LNG imports.
3.3. Disruption of Algerian Supplies versus Strategic Base Case
Algerian natural gas production is important for the European and global natural gas
markets for a number of reasons. First, natural gas production costs in Algeria are
relatively low, due to geographical and geological conditions. Second, Algerian natural
gas can be exported to Europe via o⁄shore pipeline through the Mediterranean Sea.
Currently, there are two pipelines in use, one to Italy and one to Spain, with a total
capacity of 34 bcm. Two more pipelines between Algeria and Europe will be on stream
before 2011. Third, Algeria is an important exporter of LNG, being the ￿rst country to
start LNG supplies in the 1960s, and currently having a combined liquefaction capacity of
30.8 bcm. Its geographic location allows Algeria to arbitrage between supplying Europe
and North America with LNG. In the strategic base case results, 24% of the Algerian
LNG goes to North America, the rest to Europe.
To simulate a curtailment of Algerian natural gas supplies, the production capacity of
Algeria was set equal to zero. This disruption leads to a drop in model-wide consumption
of 5.2%, from 674 bcm (SBC) to 639 bcm. The model-wide production level falls by
5.3% to 683 bcm. European consumption also decreases, by 4.5%, to 498 bcm, and LNG
supplies to Europe fall by 14 bcm to 23 bcm. The shortage in natural gas and especially
LNG supplies leads to a price level increase of 11% to 170 e/kcm globally, and an increase
of 10% to 163 e/kcm in Europe. Storage supplies 69 bcm of European consumption, about
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5 bcm less than in SBC.
Italy and Spain are the main importers of Algerian natural gas. The Mediterranean
o⁄shore pipelines land there and both countries are LNG importers. In the SBC, the
Algerian supplies to Italy account for 27% of total Italian consumption; for Spain, Algeria
contributes to even larger 88% of its total supplies. Figures 9 and 10 show the supply
diversi￿cation of Italy and Spain in SBC and ALG. A main di⁄erence is that Italy receives
its Algerian supplies by pipeline, whereas Spain receives about 3
4of its Algerian supplies as
LNG. When Algerian supplies are disrupted, both countries face a drop in consumption
of roughly 10% of their consumption in SBC. Although Spain relies more on Algerian
gas than Italy, in this crisis situation it is more ￿ exible to ￿nd alternative gas suppliers
by turning to the world-wide LNG market.

























Figure 9. Gas supply to Italy in SBC and ALG
A closer look at the European market in Tables 3 and 4 shows that the falling Italian
imports from Algeria are compensated by an increase of the pipeline imports from the
Netherlands, Russia , and to a lesser extent from Norway. The Dutch exports to Italy re-
duce the German imports from the Netherlands, but Germany can compensate by raising
its imports from Russia. Overall, Russia (+25.5 bcm/y) and the United Kingdom (+1.1
bcm/y, incorporated in category "other") are the only pipeline exporters that bene￿t from
the disruption of Algerian supplies by exporting more gas at higher prices to Europe. All
other (pipeline and LNG) suppliers operate close to or at their (production or transport)
capacity limits and Russia is the only producer with signi￿cant spare capacity. Spain
hardly compensates the lacking pipeline imports because of lacking pipeline connections
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Figure 10. Gas supply to Spain in SBC and ALG
with the rest of Europe. Spain is connected to the European mainland only via a small
pipeline to its neighbor France, with an annual capacity of 3 bcm. However, Spain can
compensate with LNG supplies from Egypt and the Middle East. Thus, the presence of
pipeline capacity plays an important role in determining the alternative supply schemes
of Spain, Italy and overall in Europe.
In the global LNG market, Algerian LNG supplies go to Europe (76%) and to North
America (24%) in the base case scenario. In the Algeria disruption case, falling LNG
supplies to North America are mostly compensated by higher LNG exports from Trinidad
and Tobago and from Norway. While Norway is the marginal LNG supplier in the SBC,
it increases its total LNG exports in the ALG case (which are now shipped to North
America) and bene￿ts from the scarceness of LNG in the global markets. There is a shift
in Egyptian LNG supplies (from other European importers to Spain) and in Middle East
exports (from Asia partly to Europe) but the binding liquefaction constraints do not allow
for entirely compensating for the falling Algerian supplies in the global market. Italy does
not import any LNG when Algerian supplies are disrupted, as all LNG imports are drawn
by Spain. In essence, in both the pipeline and LNG markets, physical transport capacity
is fundamental for determining the ￿ ows in the natural gas market.
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Table 3
Pipeline Flows in SBC and ALG
Pipeline Exports TO Italy Spain Germany Rest Of Europe Total
Algeria SBC 19.6 6.9 0.5 4.5 31.5
ALG
Russia SBC 25.0 0.8 17.6 73.3 116.7
ALG 30.8 1.1 32.3 78.1 142.3
Netherlands SBC 7.4 0.9 23.9 42.9 75.0
ALG 11.3 0.9 16.8 45.9 74.9
Norway SBC 6.0 1.1 20.5 51.5 79.2
ALG 8.8 0.8 14.6 50.0 74.2
Other SBC 14.5 0.4 23.7 144.5 183.1
ALG 15.0 0.4 19.9 148.9 184.2
Total SBC 72.5 10.1 86.2 316.8 485.6
ALG 66.0 3.2 83.6 322.9 475.6
Table 4
LNG Flows in SBC and ALG
LNG Exports Spain Other Europe North America Asia Total
Algeria SBC 17.4 6.1 7.3 30.8
ALG
Egypt SBC 13.2 13.2
ALG 13.2 13.2
Middle East SBC 39.6 39.6
ALG 7.9 2.3 29.4 39.6
Norway SBC 1.0 1.0
ALG 5.7 5.7
Trinidad SBC 12.3 0.9 13.2
ALG 13.2 13.2
Nigeria SBC 11.4 11.4
ALG 0.8 10.6 11.4
Other SBC 85.6 85.6
ALG 85.7 85.7
Total SBC 17.4 20.3 31.1 126.1 194.8
ALG 21.1 3.1 29.5 115.1 168.8
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3.4. Increased Transport Capacity in the Near Future (2011) versus Strategic
Base Case
The current development towards an increasing importance of LNG in the world natural
gas markets will continue at a rapid pace through 2011. The International Energy Agency
predicts the share of LNG to double from 2006 to 2010, to approximately 11% of world
natural gas consumption [47]. An increased capacity expansion case is used to analyze how
a bigger supply and import potential of LNG in￿ uences the European natural gas market.
For the expansion scenario to be realistic, pipeline and LNG projects that are known or
expected to come on line by 2011 are used.11 Predictions for a longer time horizon than the
next ￿ve years are di¢ cult because decisions on infrastructure and production expansions
after 2011 are yet to be made.
In particular, a number of regasi￿cation projects to come on line are assumed, in Europe
(Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, see Figure 1), as well as in North America (the U.S.,
Canada and Mexico) and the rest of the world. Upstream, a considerable amount of
additional liquefaction capacity is expected to become operational by 2011. The highest
increases of total capacity will come from the Middle East (increase by a factor of three,
to an annual capacity of 120 bcm), from West Africa (also by a factor of three, to 48
bcm) and from Australia and Southeast Asia (increase by 50% to 140 bcm together). The
coverage of our model, which includes all LNG exporters and importers, allows analyzing
questions such as the arbitrage of suppliers in the Atlantic basin between Europe and
North America, and the arbitrage of the Middle East LNG exporters between the Atlantic
and the Paci￿c basin.
There are less pipeline construction projects until 2011 than LNG projects. However,
some signi￿cant pipeline projects are assumed to be built, such as: 1. the ￿rst line of the
Nordstream pipeline from Russia to Germany through the Baltic Sea; 2. two pipelines in
the Mediterranean Sea, from Algeria to Italy, and from Algeria to Spain.
To simulate the natural gas market in 2011, production capacities and reference con-
sumption values in the demand function [15] were adjusted in addition to liquefaction,
regasi￿cation and pipeline capacities. Given the considerable pipeline and LNG conges-
tion in the base case scenario, one can expect an increase in natural gas trade, production,
and consumption from the capacity expansion and higher demand. Indeed, Figure 5 shows
a rise of model-wide production of natural gas by 40% under the capacity expansion case
compared to the SBC scenario, to a total of 1009 bcm per year. European consumption
alone grows by 22% to 639 bcm. The share of LNG imports in Europe increases from
6% to 14.5% (92 bcm). With a projected demand increase in the period 2004-2011 of 123
bcm [15], and a model outcome of 117 bcm, the anticipated capacity expansions seem to
somewhat accurately represent the increase in European gas demand for the period up to
2011.
A closer look at the details of LNG trade behind the values in Table 5 12 shows that the
11Data on pipeline and LNG projects are from di⁄erent sources, such as the IEA [47], and gas sector
journals [65].
12The LNG liquefaction capacity of Equatorial Guinea that is expected to come on-line in the next ￿ve
years is for the case 2011 assigned to the LNG node Nigeria, which should be viewed more generally as
"West Africa".
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Table 5
LNG trade ￿ ows in 2011 [bcm]
From! NO ALG EGP ARB AUS RUS SEA TRI LIB NIG Total
Europe 1.6 17.5 72.3 91.3
N-America 31.8 27.1 29.1 2.5 45.6 136.2
Asia 13.4 38.2 13.0 90.2 154.8
Total in 1.6 31.8 17.5 119.0 38.2 13.0 90.2 29.1 2.5 45.6 388.4
U.S will draw most of the LNG in the Atlantic basin. North America as a whole receives
136.2 bcm of LNG imports compared to 91.3 bcm in Europe. In particular, the U.S. will
be the exclusive importer of Algerian, Libyan, West African (Nigerian) and Trinidad and
Tobago LNG. The Middle East LNG exports, however, are characterized by a large mix
of receiving countries in North America (23% of the Middle East exports), Europe (59%)
and Asia (16%). This indicates that while there is a clear result in favor of the U.S. of
the arbitrage in the Atlantic basin, there is no apparent tendency of the arbitrage of the
Middle East exporters between the Atlantic and Paci￿c basins. European LNG imports
only come from Norway, Egypt, and the Middle East. The main reasons for the dominant
importing position of the U.S. can be found in the demand function assumptions (high
demand growth in the U.S.) and in the (production and transport) cost structure.
Overall, in a competitive market for LNG, (production and) transport costs, and hence
geography, would play an important role in determining the LNG trade relations. The
Paci￿c and the Atlantic basins would mainly be supplied by exporters located in the
same basin, with the Middle East providing swing supplies between the two basins. These
results di⁄er signi￿cantly from regional models of the European market which do not take
into account demand for LNG in other world regions.In [38], for example, the authors ￿nd
a larger diversity of European imports from all possible LNG sources and no cuto⁄of some
sources.
For the pipeline market in Europe, the additional pipeline capacity leads to an increase
of pipeline imports, providing some justi￿cation for the investments. Russia is able to
increase its exports to Europe in 2011 to 142 bcm (compared to 117 bcm in 2011), and in
particular to Germany, the destination of the Nordstream pipeline (from 17.6 bcm in the
SBC scenario to 25.2 bcm in 2011). However, it must be noted that the current (2004)
export capacity of pipelines from Russia to Europe already is of the order of 150 bcm,
and that in 2011 Russia would still not be exporting at its full capacity. The Nordstream
pipeline project must rather be understood as a strategic option in the transit game with
Ukraine and Belarus. Algeria￿ s pipeline exports in the SBC scenario, however, are bound
by the available pipeline capacity. The reason for this are the relatively cheap production
costs of Algerian natural gas. Logically, the Algerian exports in 2011 will rise drastically
after the construction of two new pipelines through the Mediterranean Sea, from 31.5
bcm in the base year to 49.2 bcm in 2011.
Storage delivers 11.5 % of the total natural gas consumption in Europe, and operates
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Figure 11. Decomposition of costs and pro￿ts among agents in the supply chain
at its capacity limit.13 Price levels in terms of e2004/kcm rise to 153 and 157 for Europe
and the global LNG market, respectively; this is 2.1% and 1.6% higher than the 2004
levels. These numbers must be considered with caution as they are dependent on the
di⁄erent assumptions for 2011, especially with respect to demand elasticities and demand
functions calibrations.
3.5. Decomposition of costs and pro￿ts in the supply chain
Between the gas well and the end user, several middlemen add value to the gas. One
would expect that the more competitive the market and the more supply and transport
capacity there is available, the lower the total pro￿ts would be as a percentage of the total
added value (i.e., total consumer spending for this study).
Figure 11 supports this intuition. The lower parts are the producers￿costs and pro￿ts
(total of producers and transmitters); the upper parts the aggregate costs and pro￿ts
of lique￿ers, regasi￿ers and storage operators. Market power adds e 11 billion to total
producer pro￿ts (e33 billion in PCM vs. e44 billion in SBC). Alternatively, because of
market power consumers pay e11 billion extra (e103 vs. e92 billion), for almost 8% less
gas with the di⁄erence going to the producers (and transmitters).
As stated earlier, the disruption of the Ukraine transit has a higher impact on the total
consumed volume than the disruption of the Algerian supplies. It is interesting to see
that total consumer spending for both disruption cases is signi￿cantly higher than in the
SBC, and between the two of them almost equal: e107.5 bln in UKR vs. e108.3 bln in
13Note that the storage capacity was not changed in the model from 2004 to 2011.
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ALG, for consumed volumes 604 vs. 640 bcm respectively. Especially in the UKR case,
the producers bene￿t highly from the lack of alternative gas suppliers, and their pro￿ts
add up to 50% of the total consumer spending. In 2011, producer pro￿ts go up a modest
3.2% relative to the SBC 2004. Lique￿ers and regasi￿ers then bene￿t from playing a more
signi￿cant role and see their added pro￿ts sextuple, while supplied volumes only about
double.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we have described a detailed and extensive model of the European natural
gas market which includes 52 countries that produce, consume, or ship gas to Europe.
The full supply chain is modeled, including producers and their marketing arms which
we call "transmitters", pipeline and storage operators, marketers, lique￿ers, regasi￿ers,
LNG tankers and ￿nal consumption. The producers via their transmitters are modeled
as strategic players with the possibility of market power; all other players are posited as
price-takers. We chose this speci￿cation for two reasons. First, we are concentrating on
international trade of natural gas where the market power possibility of the transmitters
is the dominant characteristic. Second, modeling more than one type of player as strategic
would give a more complex problem (in the complementarity framework, this would be
an MPEC) that is hard to solve for a large-scale problem as ours.
The economic behavior of the players is characterized by solving appropriate optimiza-
tion problems except for the LNG tankers and marketers which are implicitly modeled
via cost and demand curves, respectively. Collecting the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
optimality conditions for the players￿optimization problems, and combining them with
market-clearing conditions results in a complementarity system. The model is calibrated
to market outcomes for the base year 2004. A series of cases is run to reveal insights about
the European and worldwide natural gas market. The cases cover: a strategic base case in
which the producers (transmitters) can exert market power, a case in which the transmit-
ters are modeled as perfectly competitive, a disruption of Russian gas supplies through
Ukraine, disruption of Algerian gas supplies, and a capacity expansion case for the year
2011, with the last three assuming strategic behavior on the part of the transmitters.
When looking at the case of perfect competition, the strategic base case, and the lessons
learned from calibration, the low production and consumption levels when assuming full
Cournot market power may indicate that the main players in Europe are either not fully
Cournot players, or possibly that policy and old long term contracts in place prevents
them to exert their full market power. However even with lower than full Cournot market
power levels, average prices in Europe are as much as 27% higher than in a perfectly
competitive market.
A disruption in Russian supplies to Europe through the Ukraine may cause a substi-
tution e⁄ect with worldwide higher LNG consumption and prices. The curtailment of
Algerian supplies shows that high import shares from a single supplier are by itself not a
cause for concern, ￿ exibility is key in managing dependency. A mature global LNG spot
market could possibly provide such ￿ exibility, at least for countries with signi￿cant LNG
regasi￿cation capacity. For countries relying on the pipeline market, su¢ cient pipeline
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import capacity and a diverse supply portfolio is key for securing their imports. The
capacity expansion case illustrates that LNG will be competitive with gas supplied by
long-distance underwater pipelines. With the currently ongoing large investments in new
LNG facilities in an increasing number of countries, a global LNG market is arising. The
model provides insights in the future perspectives of LNG trade where Europe and North
America will be in competition for LNG in the Atlantic basin, and model results indicate
that North America could attract more LNG. Europe will continue to rely on its regional
pipeline gas supplies to satisfy the majority of its demand (85% in the capacity expansion
case), with LNG providing an element of supply security through diversi￿cation. The
great detail of the model in terms of players and geographical coverage provides in-depth
insight into the supply situation of each country.
Future work will be in three directions: extending this work to a more detailed repre-
sentation of other regions beside Europe; allowing for stochasticity in the players problem
to better re￿ ect uncertainty in actual markets; and modeling of forward markets and
capacity investments.
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Appendix A: Country groups and abbreviations
The data set that we have used for running the model comprises of 52 countries. The
following tables show the countries logically grouped according to their world regions, as
well as the abbreviations used to refer to them in tables and ￿gures.
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Asia and Australia Country Abbreviations





South East Asia SEA
South Korea KOR
Taiwan TW
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Table 12
Southeast Asia Countries









Trinidad & Tobago TRI
United States USA
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